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Federal. Reserve Control of Bank Credit 
I. Introduction 
Bank credit, in such a highly developed economy as there exists 
in the United States today, is of utmost importance to everyone; the 
greater or lesser availability of money for spending is one of the major 
determinants of the entire level of economic activity and thus of whether 
we have inflation or depression.* Credit and its investment potential 
constitute a very dynamic force in the economic fiber of the nation. 
However, the idea of bank credit, its construction, and admin-
istration is to many but a nebulous concept. Further, any discussion 
into its regulation only delves further into the abstract relms of eco-
nomic theory. This should not be, and is not true; and si:rx:e bank credit 
does constitute such a vital factor in our economy, and since it does 
concern so many both directly and indirectly, a study of bank credit and 
the Federal Reserve's policy is both timely, practical, and important. 
Bank credit is a very potent instrument; it may be either a 
blessing or a curse, depending upon the way it is used. It is far from 
a passive element in the economy, contrary to what some may think; but 
it is, rather, a vital force upon which the prosperity of the nation is 
inextricably dependent. The concept of credit policy is an old one in 
the history of European banking, but is comparatively new in the United 
States.** With the organization of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, 
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the first true credit policy was instituted in this country; and in the 
near:cy two score years since its inception, the Federal Reserve has 
operated under many different conditions. One of the main duties of the 
Reserve authorities has been the maintenance of monetar.y and credit con-
ditions favorable to sound business activity in all fields--agricultural, 
industrial, and commercial.* Therefore, it can be seen that the Federal 
Reserve control of bank credit through its several facilities is a very 
vital and current issue. 
A good deal of material has been written on the subject of 
Federal Reserve control of bank credit; however it has never been limited 
to a strict consideration of the problem, nor will such be the case here. 
For it touches on too many issues, it being such a fundamental objective 
of the system, to be so restricted. Instead, this paper intends to 
touch on several ramifications of the subject which are of particular 
importance at the present time, especial:cy the issue of Federal Reserve 
independence which is being challenged. The United States, along with 
the rest of the world, has witnessed a period of great change in the past 
ten years; it has not been restricted to the physical alone, but the 
thinking and perspective of many people have also undergone considerable 
alteration. In the light of this, it is well to reconsider such a vital 
issue as this and to explore its potentials and its problems. 
* 8, P• 23 
II. Ear:cy History 
In order to study the problem of the Federal Reserve's control 
of the commercial credit in the United States, a brief sketch of 
American banking history and in particular the Federal Reserve System, 
is imperative. American banking, although it is comparative:cy young, 
has taken on many forms through the years; it has run the gamut from 
almost complete government control and supervision to periods character-
ized by an almost total lack of the same. 
The first bank, in any modern sense of the word, was the Bank 
of North America, established in Philadelphia in 1782. Prior to this, 
banld.ng functions were carried on in an infonnal manner by merchants 
and colonial governments. The Bank of North .America and subsequent 
institutions were on:cy a natural outgrowth of the merchants' activities 
in extending short-term credit among one another and were essential:cy., 
in character, commercial banks organized for the purpose of assisting 
the mercantile pursuits of their organizers. 
However, with the advancing frontier inland and the growing 
percentage of the population engaged in agricultural and industrial 
labor, the number of banks increased tremendous:cy with the constant 
demand for credit. But, they had no choice than to lend on the cus-
tomer's condition, which was for long-term credit. This precipitated 
a break from the previous mercantile tradition of banking, although the 
latter still exerted great influence in banld.ng thought. "In ear:cy 
American banking, the process of extending credit resulted in an enlarge-
ment of bank note circulation and not, as at present, in an enlargement 
of deposits."* Bank notes were given for the amount of the loan and 
these constituted the greater part of the public 1s means of monetary 
pa:yment. "Note issue was the outstanding function of banks in the earlier 
periods of American banking history; the deposit function became out-
standing in the later periods."** 
In 1791, the Congress chartered the first Bank of the United 
States, which continued in operation until 1811. Again in 1816, the 
Congress chartered the second Bank of the United States; and again its 
charter was not renewed in 1836. The Federal government held stock in 
these banks and they acted as fiscal agents for the government. The 
Banks were opposed notably on the ground that the Congress had no 
constitutional authority to charter them; this in spite of the fact 
that the Second Bank of the United States was constitutionally affirmed 
by the Supreme Court in 1819 and again in 1824. These banks marked the 
first entry of the Federal Government into the banking field. 
"Controversy as to the constitutionality of a bank charter 
granted by the Federal Government was accompanied by controversy as to 
the constitutionality of bank charters granted by the States."*** The 
argument evolved from the Constitutional prohibition against States 
coining money or issuing bills of credit; if the States lacked this 
power, it was reasoned, they could not charter banks with the power to 
issue notes and bills. However, by 1836 there were over 700 banks with 
State charters and their notes constituted the larger part of the money 
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in circulation. Meanwhile, a great number of unincorporated banking 
houses sprang up; they were frequent~ 11private11 banks because of their 
disassociation with any form of Government, either state or federal. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the right of States to issue charters in 1837• 
They were sometimes handicapped by their inability to issue notes, by 
State legislation, but as a class were as reputable as incorporated 
institutions. 
In 1829, the first measure of regulation was enacted in the 
state of New York--the Safety Fund Act. It required banks to maintain 
a fund against the redemption of notes of banks which failed; it was 
very similar to the deposit insurance of today but was not near~ as 
comprehensive. The scope of the fund was diminished by a gradual decline 
in note issue and a rise in private banks to whose notes the fund was 
not applicable. Despite this, it served as an experiment in banking 
control, and proved to be a forerunner of present day practice. In 
1838, New York again pioneered in banking legislation with the Free Bank-
ing Act. Prior to this Act, a charter could be obtained on~ through an 
action by the legislature, giving a somewhat monopolistic position to 
most banks. In addition, many banks were failing to honor their notes; 
both conditions giving concern to the general public. The Free Banking 
Act authorized anyone to get a charter who complied to certain general 
conditions, without a legislative act; it also required that certain 
securities be pledged with the banking authorities of the stateagainst 
their circulating notes. This served to ease the pressure on the few 
banks and provide for a more reliable circulating medium. 
6. 
Free banldng spread rapi~ through many states, particularly 
in the West. In many instances it degenerated into an outright swindle. 
Therefore, the banking business fell into general disrepute and was even 
outlawed in several states, whereupon it became the monopoly of the state; 
many state laws were enacted showing a general distrust of banks. Free 
banki.ng was generally retained in most states but the "freedom" was 
greatly curbed; the authorities now retained the power of granting 
charters only to responsible management and only wMre there was a rea-
sonable promise of a successful operation. 
The first use of bank reserves, which today constitute such a 
vi tal part of the banld..ng system, was in 1837. The Free Banking Act of 
New York required that a reserve be maintained against only circulating 
notes. louisiana adopted legislation in 1842 which required each bank 
to maintain cash assets equal to one-third of its combined note and 
deposit liabilities and liquid assets equal to the other two thirds .• * 
This was a very progressive step in banking legislation and vas proven 
in the panic of 1857, when banks in this state survived against the 
general trend of bank failures. In 1858, Massachusetts adopted a 15 per 
cent reserve as a statutory requirement making these two states the only 
ones with reserves required by legislation. 
During the period from the institution of free banking in 1834 
until the National Bank Act of 1863, bank deposits became more and more 
important, even to surpassing bank notes. This fact corresponds to the 
ever widening scope and volume of business activity which demanded an 
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easier and faster method of payment between distant areas. In 1855, 
bank deposits permanently took the lead over bank notes and, in l9 35, 
the power of the banks to issue notes came to an end. Along with the 
preponderance of bank deposits, the function of extending credit through 
deposits became an important factor in banking. 
When the Second Bank of the United states ceased in 1836, the 
government was left without a fiscal agent and again was left with the 
problem of decentralizing its activities with the public. In 1846, the 
first pemanent Independent Treasury System was set up. At first it was 
the plan to carry all government funds in their vaults; but the constant 
problem of transferring funds and the expense of this operation proved 
too much. Therefore, the use of the banks was resumed before 1860 in 
conjunction with the Treasury System until the advent of the Federal 
Reserve System in 1920. 
In spite of the fading importance of bank notes as circulating 
media, they still retained a significant role in our monetary system. 
Paper currency was comprised of issues from some 1,500 private banks, 
operating under charters granted by several states. The National Bank 
Act of 1863 was enacted in an attempt to limit circulating notes to 
banks chartered by the Federal government and secured by Federal obliga• 
tions; with this legislation the government again entered the banking 
field as it had when it chartered the first and second Banks of the 
United States. The Act aimed at bringing all banks under Federal 
charter by :imposing a prohibitive tax on State bank note issues. This 
succeeded in its purpose for the most part, but some State banks which 
were banks of deposit only continued under State charter. 
B. 
National banks remained more numerous than State banks until 
1892; since then State banks have retained a large majority. The reasons 
for the upsurge of State banks are several. Perhaps the most important 
is the fact of the increasing role played by bank credit in the form of 
demand deposits; thus the biggest curb on State banks, the tax on note 
issues, was relegated to relative unimportance. Anot);:ler factor was the 
rights granted by State charters, for they tended to be much more liberal 
than those under the Federal charter. In sane States, a bank could gain 
a charter with very small amounts of capital and they could make loans 
which would be prohibited under a Federal charter; in other States, the 
banks could act as trustees and operate branch offices. Supervision, as 
a rule, was less stringent under State charter and, all in all, much more 
freedom could be gained than under a Federal charter. 
About this same time, the unincorporated fom of bank began to 
be less familiar. The advantages of' limited liability, corporate regula-
tion, and the facility of raising capital made the corporate form more 
attractive to organizers and gave the institution an added note of 
strength and responsibility in the eyes of the public. 
During the first hundred years of banking in the United States, 
the system took on many forms. And with these forms came problems. It 
can be easi4r seen that the banking system was weak and inefficient; it 
had not yet taken on a stable character capable of solving the many com-
plexities of the nation's banking and currency needs. Credit was 
extended careless4r and at times when it was most needed, was unavailable; 
it also varied in availability depending on what section of the country 
you were in. The currency supp4r tended to break down completely when 
any pressure was exerted on it. Bank suspensions were common, as were 
panics and crises. The Independent Treasury System was inadequate and 
even increased the deflating and inflating affects of the Treasury's 
collections and payments. 
These defects were wide~ recognized and at the turn of the 
century a concerted effort of constructive reforms was begun. Three 
principal changes were advocated. One was that branches be more 
generally authorized to allow large banks to maintain offices not other-
wise available and extend credii.t at low rates. The second was that an 
elastic currency be adopted that would be responsive to the changes in 
demand. The third was that central banking facilities be established 
to avoid the excessive expansion and contraction of bank credit. The 
first of these suggestions, i.e. branch banking, was accomplished through 
the liberalization of both State and Federal laws and since has found its 
place in the banking system. The other two had to wait for the enactment 
of the Federal Reserve Act of l9l3 before they were fina~ realized. 
It is obvious that the greatest need was for a central banking 
system; prior to the Federal Reserve Act of 191.3, central banking and 
the concept of positive credit policy aimed at protecting the public 
interest were essentially absent in the United states.* There were, 
however, several attempts to provide for some sort of central agency to 
meet these requirements in the past. 
The Second Bank of the United States was organized in 1817 at 
a time when many banks were not redeeming their circulating notes. 
* 2, P• .3 
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Paper money was available only at varying discounts which depended on 
how distant the issuing bank was from the place of transaction; credit 
obviously was unsound. This condition impeded both business and the 
government. The Second Bank undertook to get the banks to redeem their 
notes by exerting pressure on them because of its size and its position 
as the government's fiscal agent. Also the correspondent relationship 
of banks in large cities with those in the outlaying territories; balances 
were kept in city banks which could be drawn on for currency, for trans-
fer, or purchases of securities. In the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, these balances were permitted to be counted as legal reserves 
by the country banks. They were used extensively in the call-loan mar-
ket in New York and the volume of reserves in New York City became an 
index of the money market. Banks could also borrow from city corres-
pondents when balances became low; this worked well when only a few banks 
needed cash, however aqy large amount of borrowing made the situation 
different. In spite of this, the city banks could not create reserve 
funds, and they needed the power to expand reserves; the pani<: of 1907 
proved their inability in an emergency, when_they froze the funds they 
had and paralyzed the money market. 
Another important factor in the present development of banking 
was the clearing house; it was a basic need that these be able to pay 
any checks drawn on it :immediately. It was obvious, however, that the 
inability to make payment might result from a condition over which they 
had no control--a general insufficiency of legal reserves. They took 
action against this condition by creating certificates, issued in 
n. 
exchange for notes and other obligations, to be used in settlement in 
order to protect these reserves. 
The Trea.sury also exercised great influence on American bank-
ing and at times made use of central banking powers or gave rise to 
them. Occasionally it wouJd transfer funds in order to alleviate a 
situation for which it was not responsible, and it tried to avoid sudden 
transfers of cash which might give rise to a shortage in one area. After 
the institution of the Independent Treasury S,ystem, there was a sharp 
segregation of government funds from the banks. However, it grew clearer 
that this situation could not exist for long and the Treasury again 
deposited money with the banks before the Civil War and used banking 
facilities more and more from that time on. In spite of this, the 
Treasury's sudden withdrawals of cash fran the monetary stream and its 
forced idleness in the Treasury's vaults, ~thout reference to the need 
for credit funds caused serious hardships on the public and the banking 
system alike. 
Under different Secretaries, the Treasury made more or less 
use of central banking powers; the chief power which was aimed at was the 
regulation of credit. Some use was made of the ability to buy Govern-
ment bonds on the open market, but by far the more common method was the 
deposit or withdrawal of deposits with the banks. However, the action of 
the Treasury was not an official activity so there was no regularity in 
these actions; frequent~ they had to be abandoned before the results 
were attained because the funds were needed for other purposes. 
In spite of these efforts, the solution to the problem of solidi-
fying the American banking system was still far from solved. The banking 
12. 
system had been subject to intermittent crises and ensuing waves of 
liquidation and depression. During these periods, the public demanded 
gold and currency from the banks. The pressure of withdrawals forced 
individual banks to call loans and liquidate other assets,. putting 
deflationary pressure on businesses, individuals, and the security 
markets. This in turn intensified the aura of pessimism and uncertainty, 
leading to further currency withdrawals and so the deflationary spiral 
went.* Neither the banks nor the Treasur,r was in a position nor was 
either empowered to act to curb this situation. 
Following the severe financial crisis of the panic of 19071 
Congress created the National Monetary Commission to study the problem 
and recommend legislation. The report of the commission in 1912 recom-
mended that a single institution be created to perform central banki~ 
activities; this was modified to a regional system of banks supervised 
and co-ordinated by a central board in Washington. It also proposed 
centralized reserves, which history indicated as a necessity, central 
note issue, and central facilities for the rediscount of commercial 
paper to provide for reserves in times of stress. There was opposition 
both from the general public and from the politicians; however, in 
December 1913, The Federal Reserve Act was passed as a compromise meas-
ure which contained substantia~ the provisions noted above. 
The Federal Reserve System and its members was the first con-
certed effort to relieve the economy of the many shortcomings evident in 
the many previous systems. The twelve Reserve Banks acted as depositories 
* 2, P• 3 
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for reserve funds of member banks, whether national or state, and assumed 
the duties of the clearing houses. The overall policy of the System was 
guided by the Board of Governors in Washington; this made it possible to 
serve the needs of the country as a whole without disregarding the needs 
of each section of the country. The Federal Reserve System also acted 
as the fiscal agent of the government and was empowered to issue Federal 
Reserve Notes, which would be elastic to the demand for currency. 
The Federal Reserve System since its inception has undergone 
change, both formal and informal; it has changed through the process of 
administration, interpretation, and gradual acceptance of precedents.* 
The Act as passed was main~ interested in the service functions of the 
system, i.e. pooling reserves, clearing house functions, and serving as 
the fiscal agent for the government. It was felt that control as such 
would be more or less an automatic operation, not requiring any con-
scious effort on the part of the authorities. The establishment of 
"sound" banking practices was the directive which was to create the 
atmosphere of general control. In the early years of the system, the 
problem of control did not arise; but in the latter part of the 1920•s, 
the large role played by the New York Reserve Bank under Benjamin Strong 
came into focus. The New York Bank dominated the open market operations 
of the system, then an informal operation, and sometimes acted in opposi-
tion to other policies of the system. The problem of unified action had 
not been solved, and the policy of passive credit regulation was open to 
wide debate. 
* 2, P• 9 
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Only the disastrous financial collapse of the early 1930 •s 
succeeded in impressing vividl¥ on monetary experts and the public., 
though less strong4" on the banking community, the necessity for a 
unified central bankjng organization with the major purpose of con-
sciously helping to mitigate general economic instability and with more 
adequate powers to accomplish this purpose.* To this end, the Banking 
Acts of 1933 and 1935 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1.934 were 
passed. In general, they accomplished two major changes. First, they 
gave the Federal Reserve new powers over the volume of bank credit and 
e 
the uses to which it could be put; this was done by according the system 
the power to vary reserve requirements and margin requirements, and the 
ability to make loans directly to business. Secondly, control over the 
system's credit policy was vested in the Board of Governors in an attempt 
to achieve unity of policy. 
Since 1935, little change has come to the system, but many 
problems have beset it which were not recognized by its founders. The 
chief among these has been its relations with the Treasury., which have 
so recently came into wide discussion. The system has made extensive use 
of its powers and has., on the whole, been successful in its endeavors to 
promote a stable credit policy; it has seen fit to use powers which are 
only implicitly granted it in the statute. It regulates the supply and 
cost of credit through open~arket operations., reserve requirements, 
rediscounts rates, and moral suasion; it regulates the use to which 
credit may be put. A study of these operations will help to clarify the 
* 2., p. 12 
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the function of the Federal Reserve System with regard to its credit 
policies and permit us to gain a better picture of where the system 
now stands. 
16. 
III. Control of Bank Credit 
Efforts to regulate the supp~, the availability, and the cost 
of money, and to some extent the way it is used in extending credit, are 
the direct concern of governmental monetary and banking authorities. The 
principal monetar,y function of the Federal Reserve System is to see that 
banks have adequate reserves to supp~ the public 1s legitimate demands 
for money and to restrain banks from supplying excessive demands. 
Through the use of monetary and credit powers that influence the volume 
of reserves and the cost of borrowing additional reserves, limitations 
may be placed on the availability and cost of money, and through the use 
of various supervisory powers both the availability of money and the uses 
to which it may be put can be influenced.* 
Probab~ the most direct power which the Federal Reserve has 
to control bank credit is the ability to vary the reserve requirements 
of member banks. Although on~ about one-half of the JlJ,, 000 banks in 
the United States are members of the system, these banks represent about 
85 per cent of all commercial bank deposits;** this authority, therefore, 
can be used to an effective degree. The member banks are classified 
into three groups: central reserve city banks (New York and Chicago); 
reserve city banks; and country banks. They are required to have 
reserves deposited with the Federal Reserve Bank equal to a stated per-
centage of their time and demand deposits. There are maximum and 
* 9, p.334 
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minimum limits within which the Board of Governors can set the percent-
age rate; and the rates differ for each of the three classes of banks. 
The rates for demand deposits area 
Maximum M:in:imum 
For central reserve city banks. • 26% 13% 
For reserve city banks. • • • • • 20% 10% 
For countr,y banks • • • • • • • • 14% 7% 
The rates for time deposits for all classes of banks area maximum, 6%; 
minimum, 3%. At the present time, the ma.xim1.nn rates are in force for 
demand deposits for reserve city and country banks; for centralreserve 
city banks the current rate is 24%. The maximum rate is also in force 
for time deposits. 
The use of these reserve ratios is apparent. A bank in a 
reserve city needs a deposit equal to on~ one-fifth of its demand 
deposits; if, for example, it had $200,000 in excess of the required 
reserve, it could loan out and create deposits of $1,000,000. It is 
obvious that there is great potential in the credit expansion of the 
banks and for this reason, the Federal Reserve System was given control 
over the reserve requirements of its members. 
Until the Banking Act of 1935, the reserve requirements were 
set by statute. In an effort to concentrate the responsibility for 
national credit policies, the Act placed the jurisdiction of these 
requirements in the hands of the Board of Governors. While this power 
would seem, in theor,y at least, a substantial tool in credit control, in 
practice such is not the case. 
18. 
Member Bank Reserve Requirements * (% of Deposits) 
Net Demand De~osits 
Effective date Central Reserve Country Time 
of change Reserve City Banks Deposits 
City Banks Banks 
1917 - June 13 10 7 3 
1936- Aug. 16 19 1/2 l5 10 1/2 4 1/2 
1937 -March 1 22 3/4 17 1/2 12 1/4 5 1/4 
May 1 26 20 lk 6 
1938 - .April 16 22 3/4 17 1/2 12 5 
1941- Nov. 1 26 20 lk 6 
1942 - .lug. 20 24 
Sept. 14 22 
Oct. 3 20 
1948 - Feb. 27 22 
June 11 24 
Sept. 16 16 7 1/2 
Sept. 24 26 22 7 1/2 
1949 -May 1 15 7 
May 5 24 21 7 
June 30 20 6 
July 1 lk 6 
Aug. 1 
-
13 
Aug. 11 23 1/2 19 1/2 5 
Aug. 16 12 5 
Aug. 18 23 19 
Aug. 25 22 1/2 18 1/2 
Sept. 1 22 18 
1951- Jan. 11 23 19 6 
Jan. 16 13 6 
Jan. 25 24 20 6 
Feb. 1 lk 
1952 - In effect 
6 .Apr. 1 24 20 
* Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin 
Since 1933, gold inflows and Federal Reserve - Treasury policy 
have combined to produce a continuous easy reserve situation.* The 
great inflow of gold, either from domestic production or the favorable 
balance of foreign trade, has made itself felt through the creation of 
reserve balances of :oember banks. These balances have consistent:cy been 
in excess of the legal requirements. Another factor was the easy money 
policies of the Treasury necessitated by the financial crisis of 1932; 
thi=? policy, joint:cy agreed to by the Federal Reserve, prevented any 
tightening of the reserve requirements or any curbing of the credit 
potential of the banks. With these two factors in combination, any 
attempt to exercise credit control through the use of reserve require-
menta was, as a practical matter, impossible and as an economic matt~r, 
in curbing credit expansion, unsound at that time. It is clear that at 
present reserve requirements do not act as an effective limitation on 
the expansion of bank credit and deposits •••• It may be seen that, 
although bank reserve requirements provide a way of exercising an influ-
ence over expansion of bank credit, fixed and unchanging reserve require-
ments may not always be in accordance with economic needs. It is 
necessary to be able to vary the supp:cy of reserves that banks have in 
excess of requirements.** 
Another tool of credit policy which is closely allied with 
reserve requirements is the discount rate. This was to be the principal 
instrument of credit control intended by the framers of the Federal 
* 2, p. 81 
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Reserve Act; because when additional funds were needed by the banks, they 
would borrow from the Federal Reserve Bank. Therefore, the authorities 
would be in a position to either encourage or discourage the expansion of 
credit through the lowering or raising of the discount rate. 
In the first years of the system 1s operation, changes in the 
discount rate were the only means of expressing credit policy. Excess 
reserves were not to be had and the power to regulate reserve require-
ments had not yet been accorded to the system. It was not until World 
War I that extensive use was made of this power, however. With the gov-
ernment selling large issues of Victory Bonds, a low rate had to be 
maintained to insure that enough money was available to make these issues 
successful. This low rate was maintained until the end of the war financ-
ing in 1919. Then the Federal Reserve authorities took steps to stop 
this tremendous expansion of credit and the upward spiral of prices; the 
discount rate was raised until it reached 7 per cent in 1920. By 1922, 
discounts at Federal Reserve Banks had been cut to less than one-quarter 
of their war-time high. With this entrenchment accanplished, the rates 
were then lowered until 1925 when they were then raised to try and. check, 
to some extent at least, the terrific expansion accompanying the boom 
period. They hit a peak of 6 per cent in 1929 and then were drastica~ 
reduced in an effort to stimulate the depressed state of the economy. 
They have continued to be moderate:cy low through the war years, again be-
cause of the terrific problem of financing it. 
The discount rate, as a rule, must vary closely with the fluc-
tuations in the rate of short-term paper, and must very closely approxi-
mate this rate. If this were not the case, then banks would go into the 
20. 
open market for funds rather than the Federal Reserve Bank and thus 
circumvent the controlling influence of the Federal Reserve System. In 
recent years, the use of the discount rate as an instrument of credit 
control has lost much of its potency. As was the case with reserve 
requirements, the member banks have accumulated and have been able to 
maintain large excess reserves; this has made the need of borrowing funds 
to replenish reserves virtually non-existent. Such force as discount 
changes now have comes through their impact on business and banker 
psychology.* 
A third and probably the most useful instrument of direct credit 
control is the open-market operations of the Federal Reserve Open-Market 
Committee. This committee is empowered to go into the open market and 
buy and sell government securities in an effort to either relax or re-
strict credit. If the committee buys securities, it pays for them with 
a check on a Reserve Bank; when this check is cleared, same member bank 
has additional reserves against which it can make loans. Conversely, if 
the committee sells securities, it receives a Check on some member bank; 
and when the check is cleared, the member bank's reserves are depleted by 
the amount of the securities sold and its credit capacity is correspond-
ingly reduced. In view of the situation with regard to reserve require-
ments and discount rates and the excess reserve position of member banks, 
open-market operations constitute the most direct control of bank credit 
presently in the hands of the Federal Reserve authorities. 
* 2, p.81 
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It was not until 1922 that the Reserve Banks began buying 
government securities; this was done on the initiative of each individ-
ual Reserve Bank in order to supplement their earnings, which had dropped 
with the decline in discounts. Such independent and unorganized action 
by the Reserve Banks had a disorganizing influence on the government 
security market; furthermore, such regional activity without the guidance 
of an overall, national policy by the system failed to exercise any con-
trol over the nation's credit situation. It might, in fact, be injuri-
ous in some cases. 
Recognition of this fact lead to the organization of a System 
Open Market Committee consisting of five Governors of the Reserve Banks, 
for the purpose of co-ordinating open-market purchases. In the spring 
of 1923 this Committee was reorganized and a broad principle for the con-
duct of open-market operations was adopted.* An orderly government bond 
market was to be maintained and open-market operations were to take 
account of existing credit cond.i tions, with a view to accommodating com-
merce and business. The Banking Act of 1933 took for.mal recognition 
of the Committee, as were the principles under which it should operate. 
The Banking Act of 1935 reformed the Committee to consist of the seven 
members of the Board of Governors and five representatives of the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks elected regionally. This enactment constitutes a 
complete recognition in law of the national significance of open-market 
operations and the need of national control over them.** Since New York 
is the principal money market in the United States, The Federal Reserve 
* 9, P• 398 
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Bank of New York carries out most of the system's open~arket operations. 
Because of this fact, the New York Bank was given a permanent position 
on the Open-Market Committee by an amendment to the .Act in 1942. 
The operations of the Open-Market Committee were not very ex-
tensive until the depression of the 30's. At that time the committee 
instituted a policy of buying goVernment securities in an effort to stimu-
late the econany; by 1938, Federal Reserve holdings totaled over two and 
one-half billions of dollars. Up to this time, the Federal Reserve acted 
in accordance with the act, i.e. it acted to maintain sound business and 
credit condi tiona. In 19 37, the system agreed w.i th the Treasury to main-
tain a stable government bond market and to help in the determination of 
interest rates. This was a voluntary agreement and was strictly extra-
legal; there is no provision for such agreements in the Federal Reserve 
Act. This relationship was further in::reased during the war; with the 
immense problem of financing the war, the Federal Reserve further agreed 
with the Treasury to peg the price of government bonds towards a gradu-
a~ lower interest rate. This situation prevailed even into the post-
war years until March 1951, when the Federal Reserve reverted to an 
orderly market and stopped pegging the price of government bonds. When 
this occurred, the price of government bonds took a sharp drop; this 
proves. that these actions provide an artificial influence in the market. 
The Federal Reserve - Treasury relationship can be appreciated 
as a very important one; to have these agencies operating at odds with 
one another would only bring chaos to the financial system of the country. 
However, there must be a balance struck between them; one cannot act as 
23. 
the servant of the other and still retain and live up to the purposes of 
its existence. More on this subject will be presented later in this 
paper. 
While the foregoing instruments are the most direct controls 
of bank credit available to the Federal Reserve, it also possesses other 
powers with which it may exercise an influence over the credit situation. 
These are mainly selective controls which regulate the uses to which 
loanable funds can be put and affect specific groups, rather than the 
actual quantity of credit funds. These methods are supplementary to 
methods of general regulation, and their nerit is that they make it pos-
sible to restrain the flow of money into certain fields at times when 
conditions in the economy as a whole are such as to make general 
restraints on the growth in the volume of money undesirable.• 
One of the first of these controls is the regulation of margin 
requirements; this power was given to the Federal Reserve by the Securi-
ties Act of 1934. This law direct~ the Board of Governors to detennine 
the amount of collateral that shall be required on loans made by brokers 
and dealers for the purpose of purQhasing or carrying registered securi-
ties, and authorizes the Board to make similar determination with respect 
to loans made by banks and other lenders and in addition to prescribe 
margin require~nts for short sales~.** For several years before World 
War II, the margin requirement was 40 per cent. During the war, the 
requirements were raised until they reached a peak in 1946 of 100 per 
cent; this was an effort to curb the inflationary potential which was 
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very strong and any irerease in aVfilable stock market credit would o~ 
serve to abet it. It was reduced ~ 1947 to 75 per cent and to 50 per 
cent in 1949 and back to 75 per cent in 1950. In conjunction with this, 
the Federal Reserve has adopted an informal limit of approximately one 
billion dollars on this type of credit. This instrument is effective 
restrain1ng the demand for credit from the borrower's standpoint and 
preventing a great increase in pyr~ding that can take place in a ris-
ing market. By the control of margin requirements excessive use of 
credit in the stock market, which has caused serious disturbances to the 
ecoho.my in the past, has been placed under control. The danger of a 
stock market boom financed by credit and followed inevitably by a dis-
astrous collapse has been largely e~ated.* Margin requireme~ts do 
not constitute a significant factor: at the present time in view of the 
high margin requirement and the informal li.mi t on the amount of this 
credit. 
Another very powerful instrument in the control of credit was 
given to the Federal Reserve by an ~ecutive Order of the President in 
1941 directing the system to control consumer credit,; this was done under 
the conditions issued in Regulation W of September 1941. The regulation 
prescribed the terms under which credit might be granted, the anount of 
the down-payment and the length of tilne for repayment,; this restriction 
was limited to a certain number of listed items. Later the scope of the 
regulation was broadened to include more items and to cover charge 
accounts and single-payment loans. This was all done again in an effort 
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to restrain the rising forces of ipflation during the war years by 
restricting the buying power of money and encouraging savings. Any regu-
lation of this sort is tremendous~ more complex than the general credit 
controls; it involves more detailed administrative and regulative prob-
lems and procedures.* It is not concentrated in one market and involves 
many and varied transactions; it affects the buying habits of the con-
sumer direct~. In spite of these considerations, regulation of consumer 
credit is on4' a temporary measure to be used only when Congress au'i;hor-
izes it; this in spite of the fact that it represents an extremely potent 
weapon with which to fight inflation and keep stable business conditions 
intact. 
With the Federal Reserve System occupying such a prominent 
position in the banking structure of the country, it is in a position to 
influence many practices by the use of moral suasion. While this is not 
a formal instrument of credit polia.y, it deserves mention because of its 
very definite effect on member b~ credit. The Federal Reserve can 
make its position and views known iJn many ways and member banks give a 
great deal of weight to these opinions. It has worked well in the last 
few years on curbing an extremely ~timistic view on the economic situa-
tion with the attendant easy credit policies which might have been 
adopted by many banks. This has little to back it up as a definite in-
strument of policy except the supe~sor,r powers of the Federal Reserve. 
Selective instruments of national credit policy, though used 
in their modern form for less than fifteen years, have been developed 
* 2, p.83 
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far enough with respect to stock marlmt credit and consumer credit to 
show that such instruments can be ~ useful complement to the older and 
more general instruments--discount rates, open-market operations, and 
reserve requirements. They are flexible in themselves and can help to 
make credit policy in general more flexible Their distinguishing char-
acteristics are that they are applicable to parts of the economy instead 
of to the economy as a whole and tbat they can be used to restrain the 
demand for credit without operatin~, as general instruments do, through 
the stiffening of money rates.* 
IV. Increasing Government Influence 
The Federal Reserve Syste$ was created under law as an inde-
pendent body 1 functioning under the leadership of the Board of Governors 
in the manner which befit its purposes. While this situation still 
exists today in law, as a practical matter it has to contend with prob-
lems arising from the action, or inaction, of other governmental agencies. 
The most prominent agency with which the Federal Reserve must 
work with is, of course, the Treasu:cy. A complete divorcement between 
these two bodies is both practically impossible and most undesirable. 
The reason for this is twofold. In the first place, a great part of the 
work of the Federal Reserve Banks is performed by them as fiscal agents 
of the Treasur.y; and in the second place, the Federal Reserve authorities 
have the responsibility of regulating credit conditions in general and 
particularly those in the money market, where the Treasury constantly 
goes to borrow money.* Further than this, the huge amount of funds which 
the Treasury has at its disposal could act in direct opposition to the 
Federal Reserve •s policy if they are not handled in the correct manner. 
For instance, Government deposits in member banks can act to tighten 
credit if they are suddenly withdrawn; if this were done in a period 
when a relaxation of credit was need~d, the Federal Reserve has no power 
over it. That some relationship should exist was recognized by the 
founders of the system and origina.J.:cy the Secretary of the Treasur.y and 
the Comptroller of the currency were ~ officio members of the board. 
* 81 P• 101 
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However, in 1935, they were dropped from the board in an attempt to 
remove it from political pressure and increase its formal independence. 
This has not entirely removed the Treasury from the Federal 
Reserve, however; nor was it intend~d that it should. The two bodies 
consult on many matters and arrive at a decision by mutual agreement. 
This is best demonstrated by the Federal Reserve's action in supporting 
the goverment bond market. While this seems to be agreeable on the sur-
face, it harbors some very deep c~plications. While in theory the 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve m~et on equal terms to discuss policy, 
in fact the Treasury is in a position to monopolize and dictate the 
terms; it carries the weight of thle administration behind it, as well as 
commanding potent forces of its own. Therefore the case has been that 
the Treasury has forced its decisions on the Federal Reserve, principally 
under the thesis that it is a time of stress and that the administration's 
policies must predominate. When tne Federal Reserve balked recently in 
pegging thle price of government bonds, they dropped ten points; this 
clearly shows the artificial factor which the Federal Reserve was forced 
to inject into the market when it was doing everything else in an effort 
to curb inflationary tendencies. ln spite of the inequalities which do 
exist, the co-ordination of credit policy must continue to be a joint 
venture between the two agencies if stable policies and credit conditions 
are to be maintained. 
Another factor of government with which the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem must contend is the many agenc~es which have been set up either to 
make loans directly or to guarantee loans made by other institutions. 
The best known of these is the Reconstruction Finaree Corporation, which 
is authorized to make loans to bustness when credit is not obtained else-
where; its loans run into billions of dollars each year. The Farm 
Credit .Administration has several ~encies which advance agricultural 
credit in the farm areas. The Rur<U Electrification Administration makes 
. loans to encourage the use of electricity in rural areas. The Veteran's 
Administration is authorized to gu~antee and insure loans to veterans. 
The Federal Housing Administration can insure home mortgage loans 
received from banks and other finam.cial institutions.* It is obvious 
that these agencies can increase the supp~ of credit funis by a tremen-
dous anount through direct loans ~ can encourage a great deal of credit 
expansion through guaranteeing or insuring loans from other institutions. 
Over this great reservoir of credit the Federal Reserve has no control 
whatsoever. Very often the activities of these agencies may run counter 
to those of the Federal Reserve System. The point in question is the 
great credit potential in the handfl of a strict~ political body; and 
administration can almost alWays be assumed to have an inflation bias. 
Any recession or curbing of busine;;s would undoubted~ have serious 
repercussions come the next election. Therefore, while the Federal 
Reserve might be trying to curb credit in an attempt to insure sound busi-
ness eondi tions and avoid a violent reaction a.t'ter a boom period, these 
. . 
agencies may well be pumping credit out in an attempt to prolong ani con-
tinue the prosperity. While this ~ituation is not a necessary corollary 
* 8 
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in such instances, tbe danger is still there; and the possibility of 
this being the case is very likel,y, if past history be any criterion. 
The Federal Reserve System also has the Congress to deal with 
along with the above-mentioned parities. AJ3 it is a creature of the Con-
gress, the System is subject to such restrictions as this body may see 
fit to establish for it; the Cong~~ess may amend., abolish, limit, or 
expand the Federal Reserve 1s powers at any time. In the past, direct 
intervention has been rather limited, the establishment and modification 
of consumer credit controls being the most recent and. probably the most 
far-reaching legislation of the moment. However, the peaceful coexis-
tence has had its bad mCIIlents and its adversaries within the Congress. 
At the present time, the status ~is being eyed with great concern by 
the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt Management--better 
known as the Patman Committee. 
Two years ago, in 1949, another Congressional subcommittee 
investigated monetary policy and. in its report stated that the freedom 
of the Federal Reserve System to formulate and carry out credit policies 
for the purpose of stabilization should be restored. However, Represent-
ative Patman as a member of that committee dissented from the majority 
opinion and said that steps should be taken to increase the responsibility 
of the System to the executive b~h of the government. Against this 
backdrop and the fact that the Federal Reserve System is emerging out of 
the war years into a posi ti.on where it can in conscience take a stand on 
credit policies without the exig~ncies of the emergency situation com-
pelling them to bow to other authority, Representative Patman heads a 
committee which must of its very nature investigate the situation of 
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the Federal Reserve's independence and make recommendations to the 
Congress. 
There has been great interest recently on this relationship 
and the recent controversy, termed the "great debate," serves to point 
up the vital and basic nature of the Federal Reserve independence from 
the Executive branch of the government. After following the Treasury 
for many years, the Federal Reserve, earl.J" in 1951 as part of tba fight 
against inflation, "substituted 'orderl.J" market' for· par support of 
govermnent securities through a so-called •accord' with the Treasury.•* 
This was the first step by the Federal Reserve in its attempt to re-
establish its historic independence, which it was granted in the Federal 
Reserve .Aet and which was maint~ed in the Banking Act of 1935. The 
"accord" points up the much more basic issue of iniependence while yet 
remaining a milestone in Federal Reserve activity. 
The Patman Committee has begun hearings which must of mcessity 
enccmpass this problem. The role which it will play in the future devel-
ment of this relationship is immense. However, there are two issues 
which seem to be the main points. First, should the battle to keep t~ 
economy stable and tte dollar sound be fought mainl.J" with the indirect 
controls o! credit and fiscal policy or with the panop:cy of pride, wage, 
and production controls? Seconi, what should be the status of the Fed-
e~al Reserve System? Should it be subservient to the Treasury, serving 
as a perpetual inflation machine? Or should it seek to be a supreme 
* 5, P• 34 
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court of finance, balancing the le$itimate needs of the Treasury against 
the need of holding the economy on a steady course?* 
In preparation to the hearings on these questions, the com-
mittee sent questionnaires to many of the interested parties in an 
attempt to form a basis upon which the hearings themselves would be held 
and to aid in corrolating the immense amount of material which w:>uld be 
required in order to reach sane sort of conclusion. These questions were 
addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of tre Board of 
the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Open 
Market Committee, the Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, the Council of 
Economic Advisers, and several other groups who could add informed opin-
ion to the inquiry. These questiclms and the answers thereto have been 
collected and published by the committee. It is the purpose of this 
paper to examine these replies as they effect the Federal Reserve's con-
trol of bank credit and the independence of the system in carrying out 
such credit policies as it deems advisable. 
Representative Patman outlines in the foreward to the published 
replies six points which he urges be explored and concentrated on by the 
committee. They ares 
1. Economic expansion and controlling inflation. 
2. Changes in the int~rest rates and their effects on 
economic expansion • and inflation. 
3. Special reserve devices. 
4. Credit rationing other than by interest rates. 
* 6, P• 184 
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5. New debt instruments. 
6. Federal Reserve - Treasury relations. 
Because of the expansiveness of the inquiry, it is not possible to cover 
all the points mentioned above her$. However, an attempt will be made 
to digest varying points of view on special reserve devices and the Fed-
eral Reserve - Treasury relations. 
The rep:cy of the Secretary of the Treasury is very complete 
and covers the full range of Treasury activities as they affect monetary 
and fiscal policy. However, there are some very pertinent comments with 
respect to its relations with the Federal Reserve System. The question 
was a 
What provision, if any, is there for resolving 
policy con.tlicts between the Treasury (or other agencies 
of the executive branch) and the Federal Reserve System? 
Do you believe that this power should lie with the 
President (or already does UIXier the Constitution)?* 
The Secretary limits the question to exclude functions of the System 
which are clear:cy within the power of Executive responsibility, such as 
duties delegated by the President to the System under various Acts of 
Congress or UIXier the emergency powers granted the President. Ta'! Secre-
tary then continuesa 
The only statutory provision dealing directly with conflicts 
is found in Section X of the Federal Reserve Act (12 u.s.c. 246), which 
provides that "wherever any power vested by this Act in t:ts Board of 
Governors • • • appears to conflict with the powers of the Secretary of 
the Treasury, such powers shall be exercised subject to the supervision 
* 10, P• 28 
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and control of the Secretary." ~statutory provision~ not, ~­
ever, appear~~ with conflicts!! to~ constitutes appropriate 
public policy.# It has not been drawn upon, therefore, in an effort to 
resolve that type of conflict.* The Secretary makes note of the inde-
pendence of the System from the President and of the fact that this could 
lead to the two agencies working to impede one another or in actual con-
flict. "Since the President does not have the power of removal, it 
would appear to me that he is without power effectively to direct.•~ He 
admits that Congress could change this situation but he does not recom-
mend that it be changed. 
In the event of an impasse between the two agencies, the Secre-
tary sqs that good management demands that they get together and attempt 
to reach an Uilderstand.ing. Prolonged effects on the economy, he believes, 
would lead to public opinion causing one side or the otrer to give way 
to a settlement; or Congress might legislate a resolution to the con-
flict. 
WI think one of the most important steps toward pro-
viding a quick means of settling such disputes would be 
a public, and a congressional, recognition of the fact 
that it is natural, proper, and desirable for the Presi-
dent to seek to settle them by having all the interested 
parties sit around a table to discuss their differences 
with him. That would seem to be an almost axiomatic 
method of solution of a dispute."*** 
The Secretary goes on to explain that this would not and should not 
involve domination or dictation but only free discussion of the respec-
tive views. He further emphasizes that the powers of the President 
# Emphasis mine 
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should not be extended beyond what he now possesses to settle such dis-
putes, in essence none at all other than free discussion. 
While this position offers no drastic change to the present 
situation, there is, I believe, a consideration which has not been ful:cy 
developed, if at all. The Treasury is under the jurisdiction of the 
President, and as such, would be following Presidential directives and, 
in general, the policies of the administration. Disputes, when they 
arise, would almost certain]¥ be bound up with administration policy as 
exercised through the Treasury. It seems on~ logical, then, that the 
President wuld hard:cy be in a position to approach such problems with 
an open mind and enter into any free discussion in any way except to 
back up the Treasury and attempt to reinforce its position. 
The recent dispute between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
will serve as an example. The Federal Reserve, through its Open Market 
Committee, stopped pegging the government bond market over the strong 
objections of the Treasury; this resulted in the prices of government 
bonds declining below par. The effects will be to restrict the availa-
bility and attractiveness of credit and to attempt to install a defla-
tionary element into the economy. However, from the Treasury's standpoint 
it makes the floating of new issues more difficult and adds to the cost 
of' maintaining the debt,; also, any reduction in economic activity will 
reflect badly on the administration. It is obvious what position the 
President would take in any discussion of this problem; ~ meetings 
would almost certainly resolve themselves back to the original dispute 
between the Treasury and the System. It therefore seems to be sourawhat 
of a fiction that discussions with the President can be thought of as a 
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true tribunal for the settlement of these differences. I do not mean to 
condemn them, but o~ point out the pitfalls which they may entertain. 
These meetings may well throw fresh light and a new viewpoint on the 
dispute, but the viewpoint may tend to be somewhat short-sighted on the 
administration side. It seems almost axiomatic that the administration 
will tend to take the short run viewpoint as the course of political 
expediency rather than long run view which may be more prudent but engen-
der serious political repercussions. 
In answer to the question of how such disputes could be 
resolved and if conflicting policies could be followed irxlefinite~, the 
Secretary of the Treasury maintains that mutual discussion, negotiation 
and argument with the President would lead to an eventual settlement. 
He does not believe that the two agencies should pursue conflicting pol-
icies indefinite~ and doubts whether either public opinion or the Con-
gress would permit such a situation to continue. He recommends "no 
drastic changes in order to resolve disputes" but thinks that they will 
be resolved through discussion and negotiation. In response to another 
question, the Secretary brings out a very important point which may tend 
to clarify the terms of this co-operative relationship. He says, in part: 
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have co-
operated very well in matters of common interest. • • • 
Co-operation does not necessari~ mean unanimity of 
opinion on every problem. Nor does it mean tl;le suppres-
sion of differences to promote one view as against 
another.* 
* 10, P• 80 
Throughout tlrl.s discussion, the Secretary of the Treasury seems 
to emphasize the basic independence of the Federal Reserve from the direct 
control of the executive branch. He states that as a creature of the Con-
gress, it is answerable only to the Congress and brings out the ability 
of this body to intervene by legislation into the policies and the 
affairs of the system. However, there seems to be a great deal of empha-
sis on the resolution of conflicting policies through discussion ~ ~ 
President. Could it be that the Treasury believes that such conferences, 
rather than being open and non-dictatorial in character, would tend to 
bolster its case and really result in a "swaying" of opinion to its side? 
The question is open to wide debate, but the inference still remains; it 
seems that while direct executive control is not advocated by the Treas-
ury, there is strong support given to an increase in Presidential influ-
ence in matters of conflict between the· Treasury and the Federal Reserve. 
The second set of extensive replies is that of the Chairman of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mr. William McC. 
Martin, Jr. Under the heading "Relationship to Executive Branch" the 
first question asks what is the responsibility of the Chairman, the Vice 
Chaizman, and the other members of the Board of Governors to the Presi-
dent in performing their respective functions? The answer in part: 
"The Board of Governors has been recognized as an 
independent e:stablisbment of the Government. The Federal 
Reserve Act prescribes the responsibilities of the Board 
and indicates that the Board is to act upon the basis of 
its own best judgment, subject to such guiding principles 
and restrictions as Congress has prescribed. However, 
the Board •s iaportant functions, especially in the credit 
and monetary fields, are closely affected by those of 
other agencies of the Government. Accordingly, in taking 
any important action, the Board gives careful consideration 
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to policies indicated by the Executive or by the various 
Government agencies in order that its policies and those 
of the Government as a whole may be integrated to the 
fullest extent practicable in the light of the System's 
statutory responsibilities. In carrying out some func-
tions which it exercises pursuant to certain authority 
other ~ ~ Federal Reserve Act,f the Board has a 
direct responsibility to the President."* 
The Chairman of the Board has succintly stated the position of the Board 
in relation to Executive branch of the government. He has stressed the 
basic independent nature of the System, however always bound by the limi-
tations prescribed by the law. He further emphasizes this point in 
answer to another question regarding the legal position of the System. 
"The courts have not had occasion to determine in 
which of the three branches of the United States Govern-
ment the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market 
Committee should be classified. Irrespective of the 
branch of Government in which they may be deemed to fall, 
however, these agencies have been established by Congress 
to exercise important and unique functions of Government-
generally described as reserve banking functions--which 
relate to the regulation in the public interest of the 
volume, availability, and cost of money; and, recognizing 
the need for independence of judgment in the exercise of 
these functions, Congress has indicated its intent that 
the Board and the Committee shall act according to their 
own best judgment and direction, subject always to the 
limitations and policy directives prescribed by law. 
"Credit and monetary functions, like the functions 
of the judiciary, depend for their effective performance 
upon impartial and objective judgment."* 
This last statement brings out an excellent analogy and should be given 
much thought. Just as the Supreme Court acts as the highest arbiter of 
the laws of the land, might not the Federal Reserve Board, while not a 
separate branch of the government, act as the high court of finance? It 
II Emphasis mine. 
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does not seem that the two functions are so widely divergent that this 
comparison cannot be made with some weight. In further upholding the 
independence of the Federal Reserve Board, the Chairman went on to cite 
the original intent of the Act as expressed by its framers and Constitu-
tional and legal precedents. 
The problem of co-ordinating conflicting views and policies is 
recognized by the Chairman. He also brings out the increasing influence 
which is being exerted by the various other government lending agencies 
on the policies of the Federal Reserve System. 
"Scrutiny of the diverse kinds of interrelationship 
of interests between the Federal Reserve and the Council 
of Economic .Advisers, the Treasury Department, other 
Federal bank supervisory agencies, and Federal lending 
agencies generally indicates the complexity of the inter-
agency problem which faces the Federal Reserve in its 
responsibility for general credit and unetary policy 
that will contribute to stable economic conditions. By 
one device or another, over-all credit and monetary pol-
icies need to be formulated with appropriate evaluation 
of other spheres of activity which affect the volume, 
availability, and cost of money and the economic situa-
tion generally."* 
In the general sphere of co-ordination of policy, reference is made to 
a National Monetary and Credit Council as suggested by the Hoover Commis-
sion. Such an advisory agency, while not guaranteed as the answer to 
this problem, should be given a tripl and "might gradually be evolved 
into an effective advisory and co-ordinating mechanism in the domestic 
field without impairing the essential operating flexibility of the vari-
ous agencies."** This proposal seems to have considerable merit and is 
more of a positive step in the direction of more effective co-ordination 
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than has been previously stated. However, it would still remain only an 
advisory board with out the power of a binding decision; but this is nee-
essar.r in order to preserve the freedom and independence of the various 
agencies. This situation was commented on by Mr. Allen Sproul, President 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in a statement to this stibcam-
mittee on March 20, 1952. He said in part: 
"I certainly would not want to suggest such a body 
as advisory to the President, with the implication that 
final decisions in this field, as in so m~ others, 
would be made by the Presidential office. The practical 
effect of that might be to place the Federal Reserve 
under the domination of the Treasury, or to place both 
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury under the domination 
of some White House group. Such a National Advisory 
Council, if it recommends itself at all, should be a 
clearinghouse for the discussion of policy problems in 
related fields, and for developing staff co-ordination; 
it should not be a super authority with either explicit 
or implicit executive responsibilities and duties. If 
establishment of such a domestic advisory council, by 
the Congress, is to be considered, therefore, I would 
bracket with it the suggestion of a new Congressional 
mandate to the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, as insur-
ance that the council would not try to substitute its 
judgment for the judgment of these two agencies."* 
The joint answer of the Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks 
to the question of whether the banks are part of the government or part 
of the private econo~ points up the rather unique position which the 
banks hold and further emphasize, I believe, the necessity of continued 
independence if they are to retain this position. 
* 11 
"In our opinion Federal Reserve banks are partia~ 
part of the private economy and are part of the function-
ing of Government (although not technically a part of the 
Government). Because they are a part of the functioning 
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of Government the public interest is dominant in their 
policies. They thus carry out the original intent for 
which they were formed which was to function s amewhere 
between private enterprise and the Government itself 
(much closer to the Government than are national banks, 
but not so close as are "Government agencies";). We 
believe that it was an essential part of the intent of 
Congress, in enacting the Federal Reserve Act, that Fed-
eral Reserve banks should thus be allied to the Govern-
ment but not be a part of the Government itself.•* 
Mr. Sproul, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, elaborates 
on this point with this comment: 
"I share the belief that it was the original intent of 
those who created the Federal Reserve Systemi that the 
Federal Reserve banks should function somewhere between 
private enterprise and the Government. I believe that 
it has been the continuing intent of each succeeding 
Congress that the Federal Reserve banks should be allied 
to Government but not part of Government. I believe that 
there has been and is wisdom in this segregation. It has 
generally protected the Federal Reserve banks from parti-
san political pressure; it has enabled the Federal Reserve 
banks to repel the pressure of private interests; and it 
has provided the country with a central banking system 
staffed by men who have made central banking a career, 
and operated the Federal Reserve banks according to stand-
ards of efficiency and service which compare favorab~ 
with the best in GoTernment undertakings and private 
enterprise."** 
The above comment reflects quite clear~ the thought of respon-
sible and most interested parties on a question that is most fundamental 
in the formation of credit policy in this country. For no matter what 
methods may be available or may be used by the Federal Reserve, without 
this freedom of thought and action, its purpose is clearly thwarted and 
the exercise of its power becomes but a token gesture in the face of 
absolute Executive control. Even the Secretary of the Treasury has not 
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advocated this subservience to the President, although in many cases this 
would work to his interests and make his job indeed much easier. It 
would seem that the Federal Reserve has made out a very strong case for 
itself and that it has gained support from almost every corner. 
V. Conclusion 
The Federal Reserve System as it now stands has several prob-
lems which effect the national economy in a very direct manner. The 
greatest of these, and the most fundamental, is the independence of the 
System from other governmental agencies and its continued freedom fran 
Executive control. 
The Federal Reserve, while set up to be an imependent 
agency, cannot attain this in any complete or absolute sense of the 
word. Its operations are too intertwined with those of the Treasury to 
allow for any complete separation; no modern central bank can be truly 
independent of the executive branch of the government in times of stress, 
which are the times when monetary policy is of major importance.* This 
proposition cannot be denied; but just what are these "times of stress"? 
It seems that almost constantq since the thirties the nation has been 
in sane sort of crisis, at least in the eyes of the administration. 
Under these conditions the Federal Reserve has been unable to exercise 
its powers with the freedom to which it is entitled under the intent of 
the Federal Reserve Act. 
The Treasury has been a firm advocate of easy money because of 
the huge debt which it has been forced to carry and its insistence on 
keeping down the servicing of this debt. The Federal Reserve, on the 
other hand, advocated tightening up on credit and producing a more rigid 
monetary situation. And so the impass has existed. Senator Paul Douglas 
said a year ago: "The Treasury has pulled the strings, and the Federal 
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Reserve has danced to its music. • • • For under the guise of keeping 
the interest rate down, they have •• • created inflation."* This 
situation ceased to exist, in part at least, when the Federal Reserve 
pulled the plug on the government bonds. 
This situation should not exist and certain~ the proposal to 
put the System under the control of the Executive would only result in 
the permanent and final control of the monetary policies of the country 
being open to the vagaries of the politicians. Trere must be an effec-
tive counter-balance set up to cope with any such autocratic system. 
"We can hardly visualize the despair and spir:i. t of hopeless-
ness which would settle over the banking industry and business in general 
if the Texas Democrat (i.e. Representative Patlllan) ever achieved his 
purpose in making the Reserve answerable to the ~ite House. Tmre is 
no reason to believe that this country would not follow the road of ruin 
taken by all other nations in the world that have allowed the central 
banking system to become subservient to politicians."** 
The problem is how to get the most reasoned, deliberative judg-
ment on both sides of the issue and to subject these to conference and 
argument. The two agencies, i.e. the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, 
must meet on a common ground and in good faith discuss the issues as 
they exist, apart from any political considerations; neither bov.irg to 
the other in stature and neither dominating the other. 
The country now stands at the crossroads; there has been a 
slow drift towards Socialism which has permeated the actions of govern-
ment for some number of years. If government control is allowed to 
* 4, P• 212 
** 1, p 
encompass the Federal Reserve1 it may well lead to the control of other 
lines of business. The subjugation of the Fede~al Reserve to Executive 
control would be but one step towards an ultimate goal. Therefore 1 
Federal Reserve independence has much broader implications and should be 
recognized and upheld on these several grounds. 
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